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SATIRE AS POPULAR PHILOSOPHY

By C. W. MENDELL

Ever since the name Satire was attached by the litterati of Horace's day to the somewhat ill-defined type of literature with which Lucilius and Varro of Atax and Horace had experimented, it has exercised an exaggerated influence over the study of the type itself. Entirely apart from the numerous investigations into the origin of the term *satura* there has been a great amount of effort expended in defining the genus by means of a study of the name rather than of the poems themselves. This has been rendered especially difficult by too much attention paid by the satirists themselves and by the grammarians to the discussion of details of the type, and too little given to its broader lines. For example, the convention of making excuses for the bitterness of satire has led to the definition of satire as a *carmen maledicu*m and to the assumption that the function of satire was bitter invective.¹ The justification of certain qualities in satire by an appeal to the Old Comedy has led to a general acceptance of some sort of relation to comedy in the form as well as in the tone of satire. And even with those who discard any dramatic ancestor for satire the miscellaneous nature of the type has become an article of faith. The application of the name *Satura* to two such widely differing literary vehicles as Horace's work and that of Menippus and Varro has been, not a guide to the common origin of both, but a source of perennial misunderstanding. Finally, the humorous element in satire has served to conceal the

¹ In quoting Suetonius, Diomedes says: *Satura dicitur carmen apud Romanos nunc quidem maledicu*m et ad carpenda hominum vitiis archaeae comoediae charactere compo-*situm*, etc. The first part of the definition, which has always been the one to attract most notice, refers to the more obvious but, I venture to say, the less fundamental of the two characteristics mentioned. The criticism of vices is furthermore somewhat confused with this element of personal abuse by being embraced in the further characterization, *archaeae comoediae charactere compo-*situm**. The first of the two elements noted can probably be shown to have inspired the criticism which argued a relationship between Satire and Old Comedy; the origins of the second and more fundamental are to be sought elsewhere. Horace, in the fourth satire of the first book, indicates clearly and also exemplifies these two characteristics of satire but at the same time, in his own defense, rather stresses the former as typical of the genus.

nature of satire as a whole. Critics have tended to give so much weight to the element as to forget how entirely subordinate it really is.

The element of invective is very prominent in ancient oratory but does not alone give an adequate conception of what oratory was. Lyric poetry is frequently extremely dramatic and more variegated in form and theme than satire. The place of the humorous element is clearly indicated by a reference to Quintilian. In vi. 3. 9, discussing the use of humor in oratory, he says *rerum autem saepe . . . maximarum momenta vertit*, recalling Horace's *ridiculum acri fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res*, and then enumerates the types of humor: *urbanitas, venustum, salsum, ridiculum, facetum, dicacitas*. The rest of the chapter is also illuminating, especially his insistence on the need of *brevitas* and his use of *urbanus* of the witty man, among whose qualifications are the ability to introduce other people's verses either in their exact form or changed, as well as proverbs and "history," in which he includes such subjects as the Sphinx. All of this occurs in a discussion of oratory: it applies as well to satire as to oratory and characterizes neither of them as a literary type.

An uninspired imitator like Persius is often the best guide for one who would uncover the scaffolding and framework which the real artist successfully conceals. The crude construction of Persius' satires calls attention sharply to the less obvious workmanship of Horace's. And his blunt presentation of philosophic doctrine ought at least to make it worth while to see whether the main purpose of the other satirists is not akin to his. In the Middle Ages, John of Salisbury and Peter of Blois call both Juvenal and Horace *ethicus*.¹ Mere invective is not philosophy, although it may be a product of philosophy, and the arraignment of vice, if it were the sole function of satire, might not altogether justify a claim on its part to recognition as philosophy. But Stoic philosophy was largely concerned with attacks on vice, and even the reforming Juvenal is occasionally positive in his doctrine, nor will anyone accuse Horace of writing pure invective.

If we were to take the satirists at their word and judge their purpose by their own most general statements we should conclude

¹ See Mayor's *Juvenal*, II, xv ff.

that ethics, practical philosophy of a popular sort, was their chief field. They do not feel the need of defining their literary medium, but when Horace comes back to his *Sermones* in later life he says without ambiguity: *Nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono; Quid verum atque decens et rogo et omnis in hoc sum* (cf. his use of *verum* in *Satires* i. 1. 24; i. 3. 97; ii. 2. 8), and goes on to say that he will follow no master but cull where he will in either the Stoic or the Epicurean meadows. Nor is he much less clear in his statement in the first satire of the first book which is his deliberate introduction to that book: *quamquam ridentem dicere verum quid vetat*. In the fourth of the first book too his somewhat fanciful explanation of his type of literature points it out as ethics of a popular sort. Persius also, if any confession of faith were needed from him, presents himself as Cornutus' pupil in the teachings of Cleanthes, which he presents anew in the language of the commonplace. He teaches *quaeque sequenda forent, quaeque evitanda vicissim*. Juvenal says specifically that it is the evils of the day which force him to write satire.

In accepting some such general ethical purpose we should not be misled by the conventional disclaimer of seriousness nor by the fact that Horace at least was more interested in the way in which he did a thing than in the thing itself.

Assuming for the time being that satire is a popular presentation of practical philosophy, the problem is to find out whence it came and how it was developed. Form and content must both be taken into account. The first essential is to find out whether the content of the satires shows anything to warrant on their part a claim to a position in the history of philosophy. The second step is to find out whether the form of presentation can be accounted for under such an assumption.

At the close of the fifth century Greek philosophy was being brought down from the heavens to the level of human life and behavior. (Cicero *Acad.* i. 2. 8.) Metaphysics and theology and physics no longer furnished the themes of vital interest. Socrates first brought philosophy into the field of ethics. But this was only a part of the Sophistic movement. All philosophy was becoming

practical: dialectic, oratory, ethics, grammar, literature, politics—all knowledge was being made utilitarian. The activity of the philosophers then divided: the practical sciences need not detain us here; politics and the grammatical and literary branches are only a little more pertinent. But the science of behavior, the individual's guide of life which he could substitute for mere obedience to his city's laws, that is the chief branch of philosophy itself. Socrates broke the ground by his inquiries. The Cynics and the Cyrenaics took up the question and answered it in different ways, the Cynics holding that *Virtus* was the *summum bonum*, the Cyrenaics that pleasure was the only thing worth while. The Cynic standard of *virtus* became at once and naturally the cause for destructive criticism of *vitia*. If right behavior is the goal, then the first and best means for attaining it is the elimination of the forms of bad behavior. *Virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima stultitia caruisse.* And the Cynic set about this task for himself and for other people in thorough-going fashion. So much so that he and also his successors, the Stoics, acquired the reputation of being primarily preachers against evil. Perhaps this was more true of the Cynic than of the Stoic, but the stigma may rest on the Cynic largely because of the idiosyncracies of Diogenes and the successful bitterness of Menippus (although Quintilian [x. 1. 129] says of Seneca that he was *in philosophia parum diligens, egregius tamen vitiorum insectator*). If it does there is furnished another illustration of how easily particular characteristics can give a name to a whole class.

The man who brought Stoicism to Rome was a rather more genial and a much broader man than most of the early Cynics. Panaetius had gone so far as to adopt Aristotle's doctrine of the mean which became a typical part of Roman Stoicism. The friend of Scipio and of Laelius, he can hardly have failed to be the friend of their intimate Lucilius, and the philosophy which they adopted heartily must also have been that of Lucilius. The only long fragment of his, that on *virtus*, in which virtue, the Stoic *summum bonum*, is defined with considerable earnestness, confirms this probability with the strongest evidence. The exaltation of the good and the responsibility to country and to friend and only in the third place to self is Stoic doctrine. Further evidence from the

Lucilian fragments is slight, very possibly because of the nature of the fragments, grammatical sources. But *sapiens* and *stultus* appear not infrequently and a few of the fragments suggest philosophic discussion.¹ The scholiast to Persius iii. 1 says that that satire is taken from Lucilius' fourth book in which he attacks *luxuriam et vitia divitum*. Arnobius (*Adv. nat.* ii. 2) refers to Lucilius as an authority on philosophic questions and Cicero (*De fin.* i. 3) is conclusive: *sed neque tam docti tum erant ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris.* For, while Cicero does not highly commend his philosophic worth, he clearly ranks him as a philosophic writer. And the characterization fits pretty closely the "spoudogeloion" of the Cynic. Horace's description of Lucilius (*Sat.* ii. 1. 75.) as *scilicet uni aequus virtuti et eius amicis* has been overshadowed by the preceding line, *primores populi arripuit populumque tributim*, but it is more fundamental and both aspects are necessary to an adequate understanding of Lucilius' work.

The longer dialogues of Plato had been followed by many shorter and more popular ones. The *Notheuomenoi* ascribed to Plato himself, the *Diatribai* of Bion, and the dialogues of Teles furnish examples that are still partially extant, to which Cicero's *Stoica Paradoxa* and the *Epistles* of Seneca show more serious parallels. Lucilius simply furnished the most successful verse presentation and it was in this fact that his originality lay. This feat of putting into meter a literary type hitherto confined to prose is by no means without parallel. Aratus' *Phaenomena*, Lucretius' exposition of Epicurus' doctrine, the verse epistle, are all such. The philosophy of Hesiod's day was presented in poetry. Phoenix of Colophon is at least one predecessor for Lucilius in the field.

While Lucilius was putting into "poetic" dress the popular form of Cynic philosophy, the more legitimate form that Menippus had used did not die out. Cicero's characterization of Varro is strikingly like his characterization of Lucilius: *Acad.* i. 3. 9: *ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti, philosophiamque multis locis*

¹ Cf. Lucilius (ed. Marx.) i. 11; xxvi. 609; xxvii. 700; xxix. 811; Incert. 1119 and 1224. An excellent account of the Stoic element in Lucilius is in A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa*, pp. 443 ff.

incohasti, ad impellandum satis, ad edocendum parum. Aulus Gellius (ii. 18. 6) specifically calls Menippus a famous philosopher and Varro his imitator. Varro called his own works *Menippeae*; others sometimes called them that, sometimes *Cynicae*. (Aulus Gellius ii. 18. 6 and xiii. 31. 1.) Riese in his prolegomena to Varro (pp. 34 f.) gives the evidence culled from the letters of Cicero, which clearly indicates that Varro wrote dialogues after the manner of Heracleides, such as Cicero himself wrote in his *De Senectute*. The *Logistorici* are generally considered to have been of this type, the distinction between them and the satires being that the satires are in a less serious vein and that the *Logistorici* have no verse infusion. The more serious type, the inheritance from Plato, persisted under Cicero and received from him its final Roman form. The less serious type, with a few unimportant exceptions, was displaced by the satire written wholly in verse.

Very many of the fragments of Varro's satires are so obviously philosophic in character that his inclusion in the list of philosophers seems clearly substantiated. Especially Περὶ Αἰρέσεων and Sesquiu-llices, the Ταφὴ Μενίππου and the Γνῶθι Σεαντόν, prove the correctness of Tertullian's "cynicus Varro." Cicero (*Acad.* i. 2. 8 ff.) presents Varro as an Academic, but it must be remembered that the Stoics of the third century had taken over much of the philosophy of the Academics (cf. Arnold, pp. 93 f.) so that it is not inconsistent for Varro to dissent somewhat from Zeno while yet he is known as *cynicus*. More important in connection with this presentation by Cicero is the explanation which he puts in Varro's mouth, that his earlier writings in imitation of Menippus tried to present philosophy *quādām hilaritate*, for appeal to popular interest.

Before coming to Horace, his *bête noir* Crispinus deserves notice. In *Satires* i. 1. 120 Horace apologizes for approaching Crispinus in garrulity and probably in quality of argument too. Porphyrio comments: *Crispinus philosophiae studiosus fuit: idem et carmina scripsit, sed tam garrule, ut areatalogus diceretur.* And Pseudo-Acro explains: *Hic Crispinus poeta fuit, qui sectam Stoicam versibus scripsit.* The evidence is of no great value but it at least indicates poetry (or verses) with a certain similarity to those of Horace, presenting Stoic philosophy.

An analysis of the *Sermones* of Horace goes far toward substantiating the theory that satire was looked upon as a popular presentation of philosophy. But it must be always remembered that Horace felt free to play with any poetical form that he adopted and to adapt it to uses not originally within its sphere. The *Odes* furnish the best possible illustration: in lyric garb Horace presents not alone pure lyrics in the accepted meaning of the word; hymns, pastorals, mimes, epistles, masquerade in borrowed dress. The same freedom appears to a certain extent in the *Sermones*, but the conventional type certainly emerges most prominently. Just as much downright philosophy appears in the so-called *Satires* as in the *Epistles*, which are definitely indicated at the very outset by Horace himself as his philosophic output. The reason for this is not far to seek. In experimenting with the satiric form Horace's deviations were pretty much those of other satirists or else comparatively slight. He started with a philosophic vehicle and varied the content to a certain limited extent. When he undertook to use the epistolary type he was taking a form which had already been used for many other purposes, which was not primarily a philosophic vehicle, but had been used for various sorts of subject-matter and therefore lent itself more easily to expansion.

Satire i. 1, in all probability the last one written in that book, and deliberately intended as an introduction to the rest, begins with an exposition in good philosophic form but in a somewhat light tone. Then Horace proceeds to lay aside the appearance of telling *jocularia* and to attack *seria*, producing his real philosophic question in definite form. The attack throughout on miserliness, with a glance at the opposite vice of the spendthrift, leads up to the doctrine of the mean with the words *est modus in rebus* and, in the last lines, Horace almost uses the familiar title *de vita beata*, apologizing for approaching the Stoic Crispinus in length and, I take it, in quality of doctrine.

The second satire is, to be sure, coarse and sensational and is often used as an illustration of the vindictive personal satire. But it is a diatribe on the philosophic mean. This is the subject stated and illustrated.

The third satire consists of sound practical philosophy. The attack on the Stoic doctrine that all faults are equal is in reality

another attack on one extreme and the real appeal is a human one for charity. The satire seems to be a criticism of that part of the current definition of satire which described it as *ad carpenda vitia compositum*.

The fourth satire and the tenth deal objectively with the type of literature and, with the first of the second book, are considered elsewhere. But it is perfectly clear that the last part of the fourth deals entirely with satire as practical philosophy.

The fifth has no philosophic content except of the most incidental character.

The sixth, on the other hand, while it has the appearance of autobiographic reminiscence, is directly concerned with the advantages of the simple life, with the thesis that happiness is not dependent on position or wealth.

The seventh must be considered later with the fifth. It is clearly not philosophical.

The eighth is not so easy to classify. Horace seems to be playing with the *Priapea* at first glance. The subject is witchcraft and its practitioners.

The ninth has a superficial resemblance to the mime in form and content but is really a short narrative presenting a character type. It does not seem to be primarily ethical in purpose.

It will be worth while to summarize the results of this survey of Book i before considering Book ii. The generally accepted order of the *Satires* is 7, 8, 2, 4, 5, 6, 3, 10, 1, with 9 placed before or after 3. Horace had therefore written and presumably published (his whole defense in 4 indicates that he had published) 7, 8, and 2 before he wrote his first defense of the genus satire as used by himself. The three poems have very little in common: a poor story for the sake of a poor pun, a Priapus poem attacking what must have been very nearly a phantom evil, and one poem which had the elements of an ethical sermon in hexameters. It was this last (no. 2) that he specifically referred to in his defense (no. 4), and it was really this one alone which gave him any ground for claiming the pedigree that he does. Having allied himself definitely with Lucilius, he proceeded to copy a poem of his predecessor's which conforms hardly at all to the philosophic type (no. 5), and then wrote the three that conform most nearly to that type (nos. 6, 3, and 1) with another discussion

of the genus (no. 10) and a dramatic presentation of a Theophrastic character (no. 9).

Reserving the literary satires for a later discussion, it appears that four of the satires do not conform to the type under discussion, with the possible exception of the ninth, which has certain philosophic affiliations. The *Auctor ad Herennium* (iv. 63), in defining various figures of speech and literary types, says: *Notatio est, cum alicuius natura certis describitur signis*, and follows the definition with an example consisting of a short characterization of the pretentious man accomplished by showing him in action. It includes conversation and is not unlike a somewhat extended character by Theophrastus, only more dramatic. It is, on a small scale, exactly what Petronius does more dramatically still and on a much larger scale when he presents the upstart rich man in the person of Trimalchio. Such characterization by Theophrastus and by the *Auctor ad Herennium* indicates the existence of philosophic studies of character, no doubt primarily of use as school exercises and as material for larger work. In fact the example given by the *Auctor ad Herennium* is explicitly given as a sample of the use of this sort of characterization in law. The ninth satire I take to be Horace's presentation of a character after the same manner but dramatically and artistically handled by one who was already making a study of the philosophic dialogue. (Furthermore, Horace undoubtedly had in mind a more personal bearing which gave zest to the satire.)

The fifth satire, as already noted, conforms most closely to a Lucilian model, and was, it seems probable, a deliberate attempt to align himself with Lucilius after his claims made in the fourth. Its presence in Lucilius is not so easy to understand. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that Lucilius had experimented with poetic types as Horace often did. The short narrative poem, *ἐπιλλιον*, had been made popular by Callimachus. Travel literature on a large scale and of a decidedly imaginative nature was well received from the days of Ctesias on. That a very self-conscious, subjective poet like Lucilius should lightly parody the epic or the travel story in a mock-serious poem in the form of an *ἐπιλλιον*, is not hard to understand. It was this personal tone, the self-consciousness of the

popular philosopher, and not the autobiographical character of his work, that led Horace to say that the whole life of the older poet was spread before us in his books. The type was an easy one to imitate, and no doubt one that would make a popular appeal, introducing persons of prominence dealt with familiarly, sprinkled with obvious wit and more obvious burlesque, and avoiding all appearance of the evil of censoriousness which he had so earnestly disclaimed in his defense. So that, flat as it is to us, it was a wise choice for Horace, who was trying to make good his claim to Lucilian descent before he had really produced much of any convincing evidence to support that claim.

It would be foolhardy to try to find philosophic affiliations for number seven. Plessis and Lejay do, to be sure, consider that it is a somewhat extended *Chrie*. But such an explanation seems to have this much truth only: the prevalence of the type called *Chrie* (*dicti vel facti praecipui memoratio*, *Gr. Lat.*, VI, p. 273), witty or sententious sayings of particular men, made it perhaps more natural for Horace to spin out a poem merely for the pun at the end. But the seventh satire is nothing more than a very poor and youthful attempt at a *narratiuncula* (cf. Quint. i. 9. 6) leading up to something in the nature of a *Chrie*. As an incidental amusement at the time of writing it was no doubt acceptable, but it falls very flat in the published volume. The eighth satire is not infrequently spoken of as an example of the *Priapea* merely because of the fact that a Priapus statue is made the speaker of the *sermo*. It has no further resemblance to the Priapus poems, which were epigrammatic and usually indecent. Rather, the presentation of the *sermo* through the mouth of the rustic god is an attempt at once to win popular attention and to give dramatic setting to a satire that had little but sensationalism to commend it. It is not however fair to say that the treatment of sorcery is foreign to the function of a semi-popular philosophy. Sufficient evidence has already appeared to indicate that it was the Cynic-Stoic philosophy that furnished the background of what philosophic content is conceded to satire, and superstition was one of the forms of insanity which the Stoic attacked. *Superstitio error insanis est* says Seneca (*Epist.* 123. 16) in naming the great causes

of human dissatisfaction which are unreal: *voluptas, gloria, paupertas, mors, supersticio*. And Horace includes it in his Stoic text (*Sat. ii. 3. 77-80*):

quisquis
ambitione mala aut argenti pallet amore,
quisquis luxuria, tristive superstitione
aut alio mentis morbo calet.

Lucilius (ed. Marx, xv. 484) has left a six-line attack on superstition. It is doubtless true that Horace was not particularly interested in this subject in any vital way (cf. Morris on this satire) for it was to him less important than the vices of avarice and ambition and luxury, but it belonged to the Stoic doctrine and therefore has its place in the popular poetry of philosophy. That Horace treats it in the personal way in which he does, simply indicates the trend of his personal interest and the early date of the satire.

Finally the two "literary" satires need detain us but a moment. In a type of poetry primarily self-conscious and subjective, dealing with the ideas of the writer and not precisely defined within conventional limits, it is but natural that the poet should use his poetry as a vehicle for self-defense whether from a philosophical or from a literary standpoint. Apart from the philosophic content of the closing lines of the fourth, the chief value of these satires for the present discussion is not their character as satires but the light they throw on Horace's conception of his own work, and that has been discussed already.

In the remaining satires the chief subjects presented are: attacks on avarice, carping criticism, gluttony, extremes of all sorts, and worship of position, defense of moderation, the philosophic mean. The attacks on *vitia* are, superficially considered, most prominent; the positive doctrine is partly implicit, partly the explicit doctrine of moderation. (Cf. Panaetius as presented by Cicero in the *De officiis*. He preaches wisdom, justice, courage, soberness, and the greatest of these is soberness.) Nothing of this seems to justify the statement of Nettleship (*Essays in Latin Literature*, p. 152)¹ that in the first book of the satires Horace is a pronounced Epicurean.

¹ Cf. also Reitzenstein, *Hell. Wund.*, p. 22, n. 1.

The citations which Nettleship makes merely serve to illustrate Horace's freedom of thought. He could laugh at the extremes of the Stoics and quote from Philodemus (Seneca's favorite author for quotation purposes in his Stoic diatribes, the epistles, is Epicurus!), but the bulk of his philosophy is modified Stoicism, modified first by Panaetius and then by Horace.

In the second book of the *Satires*, Horace's touch is more sure. After the discussion of the literary type in number one, he proceeds to a presentation of his doctrine of the mean in the matter of living, presented under the guise of a parody on a Stoic sermon. He follows this up with a more elaborate Stoic sermon in three, in which he attacks avarice, ambition, self-indulgence, superstition. He mocks at the preacher but he is "telling the truth with a laugh." The same is true of satire seven, an attack in the form of an indirect Stoic sermon against the inconsistencies and follies of mankind.

Satires 4, 5, and 8 take the form not of parody but of the closely allied burlesque. The extravagant living of the epicure, the vice of will-hunting, the ostentation of the *nouveau riche*, are attacked in vigorous burlesque.

This leaves number six, which is pretty personal and less flippant in tone than most of the satires of the book. But it presents very forcibly the doctrine of contentment which Juvenal later preached and which Martial made his own: *quod sis esse velis, nihilque malis*.

The form of presentation in the second book is obviously different from that in the first and will be considered later. But the philosophic content is the same. Simplicity of life is emphasized, avarice and ambition, self-indulgence, superstition, and ostentation, the life without the ideal of *virtus*, are severely arraigned.

It has already been noted that the epistles offered more opportunity to wander from the strictly proper subject-matter of the philosophic essay. And this is true. Purely personal letters are numerous (3, 5, 8, 9, 13), and the second book is primarily literary, but there are enough epistles (1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18) that conform to the type to justify Horace's own characterization of the books as a whole. And the main thesis is the same: *virtus est medium vitiorum et utrumque reductum* (*Epist. i. 18. 9*). Avarice, ambition, and self-indulgence are still the objects of attack.

Details confirm the results of a study of the general tendency of the *sermones*. For example, the four most prominent words in Cynic philosophy are probably *virtus*, *vitium*, *sapiens*, *stultus*. *Virtus*, with its wide range of meaning, would be expected to appear more often than the rest in any poetry or prose. It appears actually in Horace as follows: *Epistles*, 30 times; *Satires*, 17 times; *Odes* and *Epodes*, 20 times. This is not particularly striking. But *vitium* occurs 32 times in the *Satires*, 12 times in the *Epistles*, and only 4 times in the *Odes* and *Epodes* together. This surely gives strong evidence as to the nature of the *sermones*. The figures for *sapiens* are: *Satires*, 17; *Epistles*, 9; *Odes*, 2; for *stultus*: *Satires*, 11; *Epistles*, 5; *Odes*, 0. Taking these four typical philosophic terms, then, we have 133 occurrences in the *Satires* and *Epistles*, 26 in the *Odes* and *Epodes*.

The three *vitia* most generally attacked by the Cynics (cf. Christ-Schmidt in Mueller's *Handbuch*, VIII, 2, 1, § 397) were *Philotimia*, *Philedonia*, and *Philoploutia*. In the fourth satire of the first book, line 25, Horace enumerates the men who feel themselves exposed to the attacks of satire:

*Quemvis media elige turba:
Aut ob avaritia aut misera ambitione laborat;
Hic nuptarum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum.*

It is *philoploutia* that is attacked in the first satire of all, and again in ii. 2 and in ii. 5, *philotimia* in the sixth of Book i, both vices in ii. 3 and *Epist.* ii. 2. 205 with just a suggestion of *philedonia*, which comes in for a larger share of ii. 4 and ii. 8. All three are listed in *Epist.* i. 1. 32 ff. and with considerable expansion in *Epist.* i. 6. 45 ff., concisely in *Epist.* i. 18. 21 ff.

The recurrence of such phrases as *vir bonus, bene vivere*, and the like are so frequent as to give a distinct flavor to the poems, and a burlesque like *Satires* ii. 4, beginning with the familiar Platonic introduction, *unde et quo Catius?* and ending with *vitae praecepta beatae*, implies a something philosophical that is being burlesqued.

The form of presentation is the most important consideration in an investigation of the real source and nature of satire. It is obvious that the thoroughly serious and elaborate prose dialogue which

Plato established as the vehicle of philosophic thought was carried on by Cicero. And it has already been noted that the Cynic turn given this by Diogenes and Menippus was continued by Varro. This dialogue form which was intended to reproduce the conversational methods of Socrates and so to popularize philosophy, belonged primarily to the investigating type of philosophy; Socrates was not the founder of a school but the fountainhead of all the schools of ethics. In Plato's hands the dialogue received a highly developed literary form. Illustrative myth, a mild humor, dramatic setting, were all part of the literary adornment and most of all the assumed colloquial tone. These are general characteristics which pervade all of Plato's works and are only incidental to the form proper.

The *Apology* stands apart from the other writings of Plato and does not call for consideration here. It is quite distinct from the dialogues proper. These fall into two general classes: those dialogues which consist of conversation throughout and those which have a framework of dialogue, more or less complete, giving dramatic setting to a continuous discourse. The first class may be subdivided into the dialogues like the *Euthyphro* which present the conversation directly and those like the *Parmenides* which present it indirectly, the speaker quoting or reporting a conversation. The second class also admits of a clear-cut subdivision: there are dialogues like the *Crito* which present a framework of conversation at the beginning and at the end and also interjected occasionally into the main discourse; others like the *Phaedo* which have conversational framework at the beginning and interspersed but not at the end; and others still like the *Protagoras* in which the framework is confined to the opening of the dialogue. Of these last the *Demodocus* alone has a rudimentary framework only, consisting of an address in the opening line, thus approaching the epistolary form, although even here some reported dialogue is interspersed. (It is worth noting, perhaps, that Diogenes Laertius iii. 50 characterizes dialogues as dramatic, narrative, and mixed.)

The successors of Socrates split into schools. Plato and the Academics continued to use the dialogue form. So did the Peripatetics, following Aristotle. And so did the Cynics: Antisthenes,

their founder (Diog. Laert. vi. 1. 1), Diogenes (Diog. Laert., p. 151), and Panaetius. It was Panaetius, the pupil of the Cynic Crates, who brought the doctrine to Rome, and he was particularly interested in the literary presentation. (Cf. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 100.) For Plato he had profound veneration. (Cf. Cicero *T.D.* i. 32. 79. Also see Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa*, pp. 229 ff.)

On the other hand, the Epicurean school developed another form of philosophic expression, already adopted by philosophers and rhetoricians, namely the Epistle. (Cf. Christ-Schmid, VIII, 2, 1, § 385.) Empedocles had used it and Isocrates and Theopompus. Aristotle and Theophrastus made use of it by the side of the dialogue, as did even such characteristic Cynics as Diogenes and Menippus. But it was more essentially the form of Epicurus and his school. Three of the master's epistles are reproduced by Diogenes Laertius (x. 35 ff.): Περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν, περὶ Μεταρσίων, and τὰ περὶ βίων, addressed to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus, ἐν αἷς, says Diogenes, πᾶσαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπέτεμε.

It is evident then that philosophers of the various schools made regular use of the two semi-intimate or popular forms, the dialogue and the epistle. The epistle had been used in lyric poetry and in official and private correspondence before it was adopted by the philosophers. The dialogue was first adapted to written expression for philosophic purposes. It was the vehicle for the man who introduced Cynic philosophy into Rome and it had become rather identified with that sect as had the epistle with the Epicurean. But Panaetius was a worshiper of Plato, and Horace, in accepting the Cynic mold, reverts somewhat to the freedom from sect that characterizes the founder of the literary dialogue, and it is to his literary form as well that he will be seen to revert.

One development of the dialogue is peculiar to the Cynic school, that is the diatribe. Possibly the kindred *όμολια* should be mentioned also, but the two are alike in being comparatively short discussions of a single thesis, often an attack on a single vice, often the elaboration of a single paradox, but always in monologue, addressed the one to a single auditor, the other to many. Like the dialogue they reproduce a natural method of oral instruction. They were fostered by the didactic tendency of the Cynic school, were no doubt influenced to a

certain degree by the theories of oratory, but maintain the same general qualities as the dialogue: colloquial tone, free use of illustration, not infrequent introduction of dramatic episode with conversation quoted, occasional wit of a somewhat caustic nature. But, with the Cynic tendency toward a rejection of outward attractiveness, the writers of the diatribe discarded the literary polish of the Platonic dialogue and, as a general rule, tended to substitute moral earnestness for attractive presentation. Bion is ordinarily considered the "founder" of diatribe; Cicero's *Paradoxa* furnish the best extant examples of the type. (For the diatribe see especially the introduction to the Plessis-Lejay edition of Horace's *Satires* and Cicero's introduction to his *Paradoxa*.)

In the three satires always grouped as the earliest of Horace's there is no sign of a conventional framework, save in the second person address occasionally used in satire two (l. 7 *et al.*). There is a dramatic setting in the eighth but nothing of a dialogue nature. In the next one that he wrote, number four, there is the second person address only, as also in the sixth, where the personal setting is a little more elaborate. The third is like the second and the fourth; the fifth has no framework. The tenth is like the sixth, and it and the first have the personal address at the beginning supplemented by a slight return to the framework at the end. The ninth is all setting with scarcely any suggestion of sustained discourse, like the *Euthyphro*.

The first book then shows only the vaguest resemblance to the dialogue form and the models for these satires must be largely sought for elsewhere. But the second book shows the form thoroughly developed. The second satire, perhaps the earliest, merely posits another speaker than the writer with a characterization at the beginning and end, not dialogue but suggestive of it. And so too the very personal sixth satire has merely the personal setting at the beginning. But the first has dialogue framework at the beginning and at the end and also interspersed, like the *Crito* type among Plato's dialogues. The seventh is the same. The third and the fourth have the framework of dialogue at the beginning and end only, a variation of this type, suitable to the shorter length of Horace's dialogues as compared with Plato's. Finally, satires five and eight

are like the *Phaedo*, with the dialogue at the beginning and interspersed, but not resumed at the end.

So far as we can judge from the *Paradoxa* of Cicero and such other evidence as there is left, the short diatribes which became the popular Cynic vehicle of expression when once established by Bion, while they set the precedent for brief philosophic expositions of particular tenets, did not preserve the form of the Platonic dialogue. Nor is there any reason to think that such verse diatribes as Phoenix of Colophon (and probably others too) wrote, were different from the prose diatribes in general form of construction. Lucilius undoubtedly made use of a certain amount of direct dialogue but there is no evidence of any elaboration of the framework. Horace obviously took the genus in its rather shapeless form and experimented with it through his first book, finally giving it in Book ii definite Platonic form. When he had accomplished this he turned to other types of poetic expression and when, later on, he came back to satire, he adopted a somewhat freer vehicle of expression but one that was also distinctly associated with philosophy, the epistle. This he elaborated in somewhat the same fashion as he had the satire except that he was dealing with material that was less raw. Some of the epistles, notably seven and fourteen, with their personal address at the beginning and their *sententiae* at the close, are remarkably similar to the diatribe, especially as represented by the epistles of Seneca.

The epistles, so far as I know, have never caused so much discussion as the satires. But this may be due to the fact that they are expressed in a form already familiar and that they have not therefore been subjected to the same sort of scrutiny. Their only essential differences from the earlier *sermones* are that they choose a different philosophic form and with it adopt a different tone: more mellow, more friendly, more intimate. The epistle, the favorite mode of expression of Epicurus, when used to put forward Cynic doctrine, becomes in the hand of the Socratic Horace a medium of discussion far less tense than his earliest efforts.

The incidental characteristics of satire begin, I think, to take their proper places when once the essentials are determined. The *urbanitas* is not un-Platonic. Its kindred forms of wit, the *sal niger*, the *ludicum*, are the characteristics of Diogenes and his followers.

The dramatic settings and dramatic tone throughout, which however develop only after the earliest poems, are the results of a conscious study of the Platonic dialogue. Horace, to misuse his own words, *madet Socratis sermonibus*. Parody was an established means of popularizing philosophy which Plato had not scorned. Bion is especially called *εὐφυὴς παρωδῆσας* (Diog. Laert. iv. 7. 52). In so far as Horace makes use of colloquial language that too is a characteristic of popular philosophy from Plato on. And, like the colloquialism of Plato, Horace's is of a distinctly literary sort, quite unlike the real reproductions of colloquial language that Petronius offers.

So far then as the evidence to be gleaned from the attitude toward the genus of the satirists themselves and of other ancient writers goes, and so far as the content and the form of satire itself are concerned, the type of literary production which Horace perfected and which he ascribes to Lucilius' invention, seems to be the metrical descendant of the popular philosophic essay, and more particularly of the Cynic branch of that essay, influenced by Horace's study of the earlier form and by his own literary genius. It recalls the closing words of Cicero in the introduction to his *Paradoxa*: *Non est tale, ut in arce poni possit quasi illa Minerva Phidiae, sed tamen ut ex eadem officina exisse appareat.*

It remains to outline briefly what I conceive to have been in general the process of development which satire underwent during the classical period of Roman literary history. In the early part of the second century before Christ there already existed at Rome a somewhat crude type of literature which presented in metrical form the popularized philosophy of the Stoa, corresponding to the prose essays of Menippus. This was the only vehicle for expressing directly and in verse the personal beliefs and ideas of the individual. Such self-revealing literature as the modern essay was unknown and the sphere of speculation and personal comment in that day was largely confined to the field of philosophy. This type of literature was adopted by Lucilius. A man of strong personality, with positive ideas and boldness of expression, living in an age when freedom of speech was largely tolerated and in a position which encouraged it,

Lucilius did not confine himself to the traditional subjects which he inherited along with his medium of expression. He used the metrical essay, which had been developed for the didactic purposes of the Stoic philosopher, to express his personal ideas and feelings on many things, even to describe the petty experiences of a trifling journey or to discuss the orthography of his native tongue. In particular, he gave freer reign to vindictive attacks on contemporaries. This was not so far removed from the Stoic arraignment of vices as to be an unnatural variation. It was largely responsible for the subsequent association of satire with the Old Comedy of Athens.

Crispinus, in the first century before Christ, followed the more strict and less brilliant type of satire, writing Stoic philosophy in verse with all the dull volubility of a Chrysippus. It seems probable on the other hand that the work of Varro of Atax was more like that of Lucilius inasmuch as Horace mentions him along with himself, as an inferior to be sure but still as one who had tried the Lucilian type. There were others too, Horace says, but, being nameless, they simply stand now for the body of writers who maintained the tradition which started with Lucilius.

Horace found this tradition and accepted the type as being a somewhat miscellaneous verse essay. It was a convenient vehicle of expression for a young man who wished to attract attention to himself in an age of literary activity. The aggressive, abusive verses were suited best of all to bring the writer to the notice of the public. He gained his point and then turned to his own defense, claimed Lucilius as his model, and sought to imitate, then to improve upon, the work of his predecessor. The sensational and the malicious were ill suited to Horace's nature. On the other hand, the quietly philosophical was altogether congenial. But the start which he had made exposed him to the sneering criticism of some of the literary lights of Rome and his first book merited the title which they fastened on it in the place of his own. Just at the moment when the verse essay was working away from the medley character that Lucilius had given to it, it received the name which was to mark it forever as a miscellany, Satire. In his later hexameters Horace developed the intimate, ethical satire, applying to it his ripening art. In content

it came to be once more the popular philosophic essay; in form it received from Horace the artistic dialogue setting which had characterized the work of Plato.

Persius followed Horace, but afar off. The genial, intimate touch was gone, the form became mechanical, and only the dogged presentation of Stoic doctrine, ineffectual as it was, gave interest to the unnatural, involved satire of Persius.

Finally, in the hands of Juvenal, the satire took on the form in which primarily it was to survive the Middle Ages and exercise its first influence on English letters. The changed morals and manners of Rome and the age of rhetorical study and oral recitation had had their effect, and the satire of Juvenal is the earnest preaching of the moral reformer, decked out in the brilliancy of epigram and the showy style of the rhetorical schools. But in the last satirist, as in the first, the popular presentation of Stoic doctrine forms the essential basis of the type.

NEW HAVEN, CONN.